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HOW MUCH IS “SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE” 
AND HOW BIG IS A “SIGNIFICANT GAP”?: 
THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ATTORNEY 
FULL EMPLOYMENT ACT 
SUSAN LORDE MARTIN* 
ABSTRACT 
The late U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia described 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 as “a model of ambiguity or 
indeed even self-contradiction.” Legal wags have also described 
the Act as the Telecommunications Attorney Full Employment Act. 
Twenty years after the Act became law, it is still being interpreted 
by courts all over the country and costing taxpayers millions of 
dollars as local governments defend their telecom decisions in 
lawsuits. The Act’s basic notion was to allow local zoning author-
ities to maintain their control over their territories with a few 
new limitations that would encourage cell phone service compa-
nies to provide access to everyone. This Article focuses on two of 
the Act’s limitations on local governments when they want to deny 
a request to construct a cell phone tower. The Act requires such a 
denial to be supported by substantial evidence, and it prohibits 
local governments from preventing a telecommunications company 
from closing a significant gap in cell phone service. The Article con-
cludes that Congress should amend the Act to reflect a changed 
telecommunications landscape and direct the FCC to issue rules 
that clarify the contentious issues. All stakeholders should recog-
nize that alternative conflict resolution techniques initiated when 
a tower project is first considered could eliminate costly litigation 
and benefit all stakeholders. 
                                                                                                                        
*Cypres Family Distinguished Professor of Legal Studies in Business, Zarb 
School of Business, Hofstra University. Research for this Article was supported 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 The late U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia de-
scribed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Act)1 as “a model of 
ambiguity or indeed even self-contradiction.”2 Legal wags have 
also described the Act as the Telecommunications Attorney Full 
Employment Act.3 Twenty years after the Act became law, it is 
still being interpreted by courts all over the country, including 
the U.S. Supreme Court, and costing taxpayers millions of dollars 
as local governments defend their telecom decisions in lawsuits.4 
 One might think that after twenty years of litigation, local 
governments would know which telecommunications facilities 
have to be approved under federal law and, if they are not going 
to approve an application to construct a facility, how to do it in a 
way that is sustainable by a court. But it is understandable that 
local governments are inadequate to the task.5 Generally, they 
                                                                                                                        
1 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).  
2 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999). Seth P. Waxman, a 
solicitor general in the Clinton administration, described the Act as “the single 
most poorly drafted statute ever enacted by Congress .... There is no plain lan-
guage in that statute.” Stephen Labaton, Slew of Supreme Court Cases to 
Focus on ‘96 Telecom Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com 
/2001/10/01/technology/01TELE.html?pagewanted=al. 
3 Cybertelecom, Telecommunications Act of 1996 (2006), http://www.cybertele 
com.org/notes/telecomact.htm [https://perma.cc/P69U-H3YC]; Susan C. Norton, 
Defining Social Policy: Should Telecommunications Regulation Be Devolved 
to the States 20 n.28 (2009), available from UMI Microform 1461501, 
ProQuest LLC, Ann Arbor, MI; Adam Thierer, Will the FCC’s Nat’l Broad-
band Plan Be “Full Employment for Lawyers”?, TECHNOLOGY LIBERATION FRONT, 
Feb. 24, 2010, https://www.techliberation.com/2010/02/24/will-the-fccs-natl 
-broadband-plan-be-full-employment-for-lawyers/ [https://perma.cc/C624-JQRM] 
(noting the FCC Chairman’s Chief of Staff’s remark that the “FCC is doing 
everything it can to provide full employment for telecom lawyers”). 
4 See Benjamin L. Meersman, Note, You Can’t Hear Me Now: The Ambigu-
ous Language of the Telecommunications Act of 1996’s Tower Siting Provision, 39 
J. CORP. L. 437 (2014); Dina Neda Rezvani, Can You Hear Me Now? The Race 
to Provide America with Universal, High-Speed Wireless Coverage, 9 WASH. J.L. 
TECH. & ARTS 115 (2013); Harold Furchtgott-Roth & Arielle Roth, Answering 
Four Questions on the Anniversary of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 68 
FED. COMM. L.J. 83, 83 (2015–16) (noting the Act’s enactment on Feb. 8, 1996 
and its “deeply contentious” legacy). 
5See, e.g., Nat’l Tower, LLC v. Plainville Zoning Bd., 297 F.3d 14, 20 (1st 
Cir. 2002); Second Generation Props., LP v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d 620, 
629 (1st Cir. 2002). 
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are made up of lay people when it comes to telecommunications 
issues, with very limited resources,6 going against very well-
financed, very experienced professionals in the telecommunications 
industry.7 Thus, the best case is being made on one side of disputes 
and, often, a poor case on the side of local residents and taxpayers.8 
One could argue that the purpose of the Act is facilitated by this 
arrangement. The Act describes its purpose as “encourag[ing] the 
rapid deployment of new telecommunication technologies”9 and, 
therefore, the Act does not allow state or local governments to 
effectively “prohibit … the ability of any entity to provide any 
interstate or intrastate telecommunications service.”10 On the other 
hand, at a time when the “little guy” on “Main Street” feels dis-
enfranchised by the power of “Big Business,” this arrangement 
can seem very unfair (even though the “little guys” want seam-
less cell phone service).11 
                                                                                                                        
6 See, e.g., Nat’l Tower, 297 F.3d at 20 (noting that “local authorities are 
frequently lay member boards without many resources”); Second Generation 
Props., 313 F.3d at 629 (stating “[l]ocal zoning boards are lay citizen boards”). 
7 See, e.g., MetroPCS N.Y., LLC v. Vill. of E. Hills, 764 F. Supp. 2d 441, 
445–46 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (concerning a village zoning board claiming it was 
not familiar with telecom applications and technical jargon and hiring one 
unlicensed and uncertified “expert” opposing telecom company’s several ex-
perts). See also New York SMSA Ltd. P’ship v. Vill. of Floral Park, 812 F. Supp. 
2d 143, 150 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (Verizon presenting testimony of eight expert 
witnesses and thirteen sworn affidavits, technical reports and exhibits; Vill. 
of Floral Park presenting no experts, letters from fifteen residents, and tes-
timony of ten residents which included statements of opposition based on, 
inter alia, health concerns (impermissible under the Act)). Local governments 
may not regulate the siting of cell phone facilities on the basis of environmen-
tal effects of radio frequency emissions (including concerns about health) if 
the facilities are in compliance with FCC regulations. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) 
(1994 & Supp. V 1995). 
8 See, e.g., MetroPCS New York, F. Supp. 2d at 445–46; see also New York 
SMSA, 812 F. Supp. 2d at 150. 
9 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56. 
10 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2012). 
11 See, e.g., Andrew Dys, Clover Zoning Board Denies Controversial Cell 
Tower, THE HERALD (Clover, SC), May 26, 2016, http://www.heraldonline.com 
/news/local/news-columns-blogs/andrew-dys/article80216227.html [https:// 
perma.cc/ZFJ2-UWQ4] (interviewing owner of home across street from proposed 
tower: “‘The little guy won’ .... [T]ower companies choose poor neighborhoods for 
towers ... where people have no voice or money to fight back.”); Katy Macek, 
New Cell Site Frustrates Residents, Officials, CHIPPEWA HERALD (Chippewa 
Falls, WI), Apr. 28, 2016, 2016 WLNR 12918409 (quoting a concerned neighbor: 
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 This Article focuses on two of the Act’s limitations on local 
governments when they want to deny a request to construct a 
cell phone tower. The Act requires such a denial to be “supported 
by substantial evidence contained in a written record.”12 On its 
face it sounds simple, but as a practical matter it must be hard 
to know what support is required.13 The U.S. Supreme Court 
was still explaining the language in 2015,14 and other courts 
continue to explain it to this day.15 Similarly, although courts 
have accepted that a denial preventing a telecommunications 
company from closing a “significant gap” in cell phone service is 
equivalent to prohibiting the provision of cell phone service,16 it 
is still unclear what constitutes a significant gap.17 
 This Article starts with a brief background of the Act and 
then discusses the “substantial evidence” language: methods of 
providing substantial evidence, and courts’ interpretations of how 
much evidence and what kind of evidence is substantial. The Arti-
cle discusses the different ways courts have determined whether 
significant gaps in cell phone service exist and are the equiva-
lent of prohibiting the provision of cell phone service. The Article 
concludes that twenty years of experience should be sufficient to 
stem the tide of resources wasted on litigating the legality of lo-
cal decisions on cell phone tower siting. Because that is obviously 
                                                                                                                        
“cell phone company seems to have a lot of say, maybe even more than a com-
munity and its elected officials”); Peter McGuire, Benton Cell Tower Sparks 
Outrage from Residents, MORNING SENTINEL (Waterville, ME), Aug. 12, 2015, 
2015 WLNR 23814832 (quoting owner of home adjacent to proposed cell tower: 
“Somebody has to stand up for the little guy.”). 
12 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (2012). 
13 T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808 (2015). 
14 Id. 
15 See, e.g., Global Tower Assets, LLC v. Town of Rome, 810 F.3d 77 (1st 
Cir. 2016) (cell tower in Maine); Stout & Co. v. City of Bel Aire, No. 2:15-cv-
09323-JTM, 2016 WL 3759440 (D. Kan. July 14, 2016) (cell tower in Kansas); 
Cellular S. Real Estate, Inc. v. City of Mobile, No. 15-00387-CG-B, 2016 WL 
3746661 (S.D. Ala. July 8, 2016) (cell tower in Alabama); Nextel Commc’ns of 
the Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., No. 3:14-CV-2409, 2016 WL 
1271385 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2016) (cell tower in Pennsylvania). 
16 See, e.g., Cellular Tel. Co. v. Zoning Bd., 197 F.3d 64, 70 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(finding “local zoning policies and decisions have the effect of prohibiting wire-
less communication services if they result in ‘significant gaps’ in the avail-
ability of wireless services”). 
17 Id. 
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not the case,18 Congress should amend the Act to reflect a tele-
communications landscape that is very different from the one that 
existed when Congress originally passed the Act in 1996. Congress 
should direct the FCC to issue rules that clarify the contentious 
issues and provide guidelines to local government entities so they 
know how to make decisions that follow the rules and that courts 
would support, and to telecommunications companies encouraging 
them to consult with local residents and make a more concerted 
effort to install the least intrusive facilities.19 All stakeholders 
should recognize that alternative conflict resolution techniques 
initiated when a tower project is first considered could eliminate 
costly litigation and benefit all stakeholders.20 
I.  THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 
 In 1990, there were fewer than six million mobile cellular 
subscriptions in the United States.21 By 2000, there were well 
over 100 million, and by 2014 that number had more than tripled.22 
By 2016, U.S. consumers were looking at their mobile devices 
more than eight billion times a day.23 To service these consum-
ers, there are well over 600 thousand cell phone towers in the 
United States.24 
 When President Clinton signed the 1996 Act, it was the 
first major change in telecommunications law in over sixty 
                                                                                                                        
18 See generally Meersman, supra note 4. 
19 See Norton, supra note 3, at 20 n.28. 
20 Lawrence Susskind & Patrick Field, Dealing with an Angrier Public, Q. 
MAG. ASS’N FOR CONFLICT RESOL., July 2012, http://www.cbuilding.org/publica 
tion/article/2012/dealing-angrier-public [https://perma.cc/9LKG-VXVV]. 
21 Telecommunications Revenue (% GDP) in the United States, TRADING 
ECONOMICS, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/telecommunica 
tions-revenue-percent-gdp-wb-data.html [https://perma.cc/RU8G-YA65]. 
22 Id. 
23 Telecommunications Industry Outlook, DELOITTE, http://www2.deloitte 
.com/us/en/pages/technology-media-and-telecommunications/articles/telecom 
munications-industry-outlook.htm/ [https://perma.cc/S7NQ-V8EA] (interview-
ing Craig Wigginton, Vice Chairman & U.S. Telecommunications Leader, Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu Limited). 
24 Welcome to AntennaSearch.com!, ANTENNASEARCH.COM, http://www.an 
tennasearch.com [https://perma.cc/W2G5-V2J2] (listing 610,671 towers in United 
States, including 1,540 added in prior week). 
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years.25 The Act’s specific purpose was to encourage telecommu-
nications providers by creating a less regulated environment and 
promoting competition among them so that consumers through-
out the country would have better, faster, and cheaper access to 
telecommunications services.26 To effect those goals, the Act 
puts limitations on the way that states and local governments 
may regulate telecommunications facilities but attempts not to 
preempt local regulation entirely. States and local governments 
may still regulate “the placement, construction, and modifica-
tion” of telecommunications facilities,27 but they may not “un-
reasonably discriminate among providers”28 or “prohibit or have 
the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless ser-
vices.”29 When they receive a request to construct such facilities, 
they must respond “within a reasonable period of time”30 and 
must support any denial with “substantial evidence contained in 
a written record.”31 Any provider may, within thirty days of a 
denial or failure to respond, commence a legal action, and courts 
are directed to decide these cases “on an expedited basis.”32 
 Within seven months of its enactment, courts in all areas 
of the country had decided cases about the legality under the Act 
of local governments’ denying applications or refusing to act on 
applications for the siting of cell phone towers.33 Telecom com-
panies, eager to beat the competition for the provision of cell phone 
service, were on one side of the litigation, while local governments, 
                                                                                                                        
25 Cybertelecom, supra note 3. 
26 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996); 141 CONG. REC. H8269 (daily 
ed. Aug. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Linder). 
27 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A) (2012). 
28 Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I). 
29 Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II). 
30 Declaratory Ruling to Clarify Provisions of Sec. 332(c)(7)(B), 24 F.C.C. 
Rcd. 13994, 14012 (2009) (finding 90 days to be reasonable time to process 
collocation applications and 150 days to be reasonable time to process other 
applications). 
31 Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii), (iii). 
32 Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). 
33 See generally BellSouth Mobility, Inc. v. Gwinnett Cty., 944 F. Supp. 
923 (N.D. Ga. 1996); Sprint Spectrum v. City of Medina, 924 F. Supp. 1036 
(W.D. Wash. 1996); Crown Commc’ns v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 679 A.2d 271 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996); Westel-Milwaukee Co. v. Walworth Cty., 556 N.W.2d 
107 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996). 
36 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:029 
pressured by constituents to keep cell phone towers away from 
their properties, were on the other.34 Twenty years after passage 
of the Act, the confrontational and litigious situation has changed 
little with all sides sharing blame for that.35 Congress has not 
amended the Act to clarify the ambiguous terms that are the 
focus of lawsuits;36 the FCC has not issued sufficient rules that 
would help local governments make legal decisions about tower 
sitings;37 telecom companies have not paid enough attention to 
the concerns of local residents;38 and local governments have not 
taken some fairly obvious, and not necessarily expensive, actions 
that would make them more successful in justifying to a court 
their denial of applications to construct cell phone towers.39 Two 
of the most frequently adjudicated issues are whether the gov-
erning body’s decision to deny an application to construct a cell 
tower was based on substantial evidence,40 and whether the 
telecom company is providing a cure for a significant gap in its 
cell phone service without which it would effectively be prohibited 
from supplying cell phone service.41 
II.  THE LITIGATION 
A. Substantial Evidence 
 Courts have noted that the substantial evidence require-
ment “preserves the decision-making authority of local zoning 
                                                                                                                        
34 See generally BellSouth Mobility, 944 F. Supp. at 923; Sprint Spectrum, 
924 F. Supp. at 1036; Crown Commc’ns, 679 A.2d at 271; Westel-Milwaukee, 
556 N.W.2d at 107. 
35 See, e.g., Meersman, supra note 4, at 438. 
36 See Norton, supra note 3, at 2. 
37 In 2009, the FCC issued a Declaratory Ruling that addressed some siting 
issues, but, given the number of cases that have been litigated between then 
and now, it was clearly not sufficient. FCC Declaratory Ruling to Clarify Pro-
visions of Section 332(c)(7)(B) to Ensure Timely Siting Review and to Preempt 
under Section 253 State and Local Ordinances that Classify All Wireless Siting 
Proposals as Requiring a Variance, 24 F.C.C. Rcd. 13994 (Nov. 18, 2009). 
38 Susskind & Field, supra note 20. 
39 See infra text accompanying note 255; see also Meersman, supra note 4, 
at 438. 
40 Indus. Tower & Wireless, LLC v. Haddad, 109 F. Supp. 3d 284, 296 (D. 
Mass. 2015) (citing ATC Realty, LLC v. Town of Kingston, 303 F.3d 91, 94 (1st 
Cir. 2002)). 
41 Green Mountain Realty Corp. v. Leonard, 750 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2014). 
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boards, ‘while protecting wireless service providers from unsup-
ported decisions that stymie the expansion of telecommunication 
technology.’”42 This is a worthy purpose; however, as a practical 
matter, the requirement costs a great deal to taxpayers and cell 
phone users in litigation costs because its meaning is so unclear 
even after twenty years of adjudication.43 As recently as 2015, 
the United States Supreme Court discussed the term “substan-
tial evidence” as it was used by Congress in the Act.44 The Court 
said that the phrase is a term of art requiring an administrative 
agency to disclose clearly the reasons for its decisions so that a 
reviewing court would be able to judge the decisions.45 The Court 
stressed that the reasons do not have to “be elaborate or even 
sophisticated,” just “clear enough to enable judicial review.”46 
Those statements did not answer what kind of evidence is “sub-
stantial” and how much evidence is “substantial.” So the opinion 
was not helpful in resolving an issue that is central to many 
cases.47 Determining whether substantial evidence supports a 
denial of a permit to construct telecom facilities remains a “fact-
intensive inquiry.”48 
1.  Defining Substantial Evidence 
 Six months after the 1996 Act became law, the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia decided 
that the Gwinnett County Board of Commissioners violated the 
“substantial evidence” requirement in the Act when the Board de-
nied BellSouth’s application to erect a 197-foot monopole to improve 
the quality of its cell phone service.49 The court reasoned that 
                                                                                                                        
42 Indus. Tower & Wireless, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 296 (citing ATC Realty, 303 
F.3d at 94). 
43 See generally Meersman, supra note 4. 
44 T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2015). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. For a discussion of “reason-giving requirements,” see Donald J. Kochan, 
Constituencies and Contemporaneousness in Reason-Giving: Thoughts and 
Direction After T-Mobile, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2015). 
47 T-Mobile S., 135 S. Ct. at 815. 
48 T-Mobile N.E. LLC v. City Council of Newport News, Va., 674 F.3d 380, 
388 (4th Cir. 2012). 
49 BellSouth Mobility, Inc. v. Gwinnett Cty., 944 F. Supp. 923, 924, 928 
(N.D. Ga. 1996); see also Jud. Prac. Comm. of the Fed. Comm’ns Bar Ass’n, 
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substantial evidence means “‘more than a mere scintilla. It means 
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion.’”50 BellSouth submitted “nu-
merous” documents supporting its application including a report 
by the Airspace Safety Analysis Corporation (ASAC) indicating 
that the monopole presented no air space risk;51 a memorandum 
from the Gwinnett County Airport Authority agreeing with the 
ASAC;52 and supporting memoranda from the Gwinnett County 
departments of transportation, public safety, and planning and 
development.53 Gwinnett County residents of two subdivisions, 
on the other hand, were represented by one resident who spoke 
for the allotted five minutes at a County hearing.54 The resident 
raised concerns about children’s safety, potential damage in storms, 
aesthetic incompatibility with existing structures, and decreased 
property values.55 The court concluded that it could not “consci-
entiously find that the evidence supporting the board’s decision 
to deny plaintiffs’ a tall structure permit is substantial.”56 
 This twenty-year-old decision raised two issues. First, 
nothing in the Act requires a balancing of evidence to determine 
whose evidence is more substantial, merely that a denial of a re-
quest to construct a telecom facility is supported by substantial 
evidence.57 In 2003, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Act 
                                                                                                                        
Communications Law: Annual Review: T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell, 
Georgia No. 13-975 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2015), 67 FED. COMM. L.J. 377 (2015) (explain-
ing the court’s decision). 
50 BellSouth Mobility, 944 F. Supp. at 928 (citing Universal Camera Corp. 
v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1952)). “Substantial evidence” has also been de-
fined as “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Michael 
Linet, Inc. v. Vill. of Wellington, 408 F.3d 757, 762 (11th Cir. 2005). 
51 BellSouth Mobility, 944 F. Supp. at 928. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 926. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 928. 
57 It should be noted that in an entirely different context, the U.S. Su-
preme Court mentioned that its “phrasing ... readily lent itself to the notion” 
that evidence supporting an administrative decision could be considered 
“‘substantial’ when considered by itself,” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 
340 U.S. 474, 477–78 (1951), however, the Court concluded that “[t]he sub-
stantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly 
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does not require a comparative test, but only that the denial of 
an application to construct a tower is supported by substantial 
evidence.58 A comparative approach would set a stricter standard 
than the Act requires.59 
 Secondly, after giving a definition of “substantial evi-
dence,” the Gwinnett court assumed, without discussion, that at 
least four concerns raised by residents were not more than a 
scintilla of evidence, and no reasonable mind could accept those 
concerns as relevant evidence supporting the denial of the appli-
cation to erect a monopole that would be visible from the front 
windows of at least twenty residents.60 The implication is that 
only reports by experts can be considered substantial evidence 
and common concerns of residents are weightless.61 These issues 
remained for several years, as the Gwinnett case became a mod-
el that courts all over the country followed.62 But not all courts 
were persuaded that residents’ objections were not substantial.63 
Two years later, the Fourth Circuit explained that a substantial 
evidence standard created for administrative decisions should be 
different from one meant for legislative decisions.64 It is appro-
priate that “a legislature and its members will consider the views 
of their constituents to be particularly compelling forms of evi-
dence, in zoning as in all other legislative matters … often 
trump[ing] those of bureaucrats or experts.”65 In 1999, the United 
                                                                                                                        
detracts from its weight.” Id. at 488. There is nothing in the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996 that requires a denial of an application to construct a cell 
phone tower to be supported by an entire record of evidence, only by “sub-
stantial evidence.” The interpretation of those words is problematic. See, e.g., 
J.I.B. Constitutional Substantial-Evidence Review? Lessons from the Supreme 
Court’s Turner Broadcasting Decisions, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1162 (1997) (con-
cluding that Court’s approach to constitutional substantial-evidence is “vague 
and confused”). 
58 USCOC of Va. RSA #3, Inc. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 343 
F.3d 262, 270 (4th Cir. 2003). 
59 Id. 
60 BellSouth Mobility, 944 F. Supp. at 926. 
61 Id. 
62 See, e.g., Ill. RSA No. 3, Inc. v. Cty. of Peoria, 963 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Ill. 
1997); W. PCS II Corp. v. Extraterritorial Zoning Auth., 957 F. Supp. 1230 
(D. N.M. 1997). 
63 AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council, 155 F.3d 423, 430 (4th Cir. 1998). 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
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States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit opined that when 
courts evaluate a tower permit denial under the Act, they must 
view the record in its entirety, including evidence that does not 
support the local government’s decision.66 The court noted that, 
in New York, aesthetics can be a valid ground for local zoning 
decisions, but that under the Act, there must be “more tha[n] a 
mere scintilla” of evidence of the negative visual impact of the 
tower to be considered substantial evidence that serves as the 
basis for a permit denial.67 The court held that the more-than-a-
scintilla standard was not satisfied by a few generalized expres-
sions of concern with aesthetics.68 Similarly, the court concluded 
that residents’ generalized expressions of fear of declining prop-
erty values also did not meet the substantial evidence standard 
to support a denial of a tower permit.69 The court recognized the 
difficulty in evaluating the substantiality of residents’ concerns 
about aesthetics and property values when they are opposed by 
expert testimony provided by telecommunications companies; how-
ever, in this case, the evaluation was complicated by the resi-
dents’ emphasis on health concerns, an argument that the Act 
does not permit as a basis for denying a permit.70 Residents and 
the local Town of Oyster Bay government, being lay people, ob-
viously did not recognize that they were undermining their own 
position by emphasizing their fears that a cell phone tower poses 
health risks.71 Perhaps the court might have been persuaded by 
                                                                                                                        
66 Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1999). 
67 Id. at 495. 
68 Id. at 496. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. The Act prohibits the denial of a permit to erect a telecommunica-
tions facility on the basis of health or environmental concerns if the facility 
meets FCC standards. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) (2012). 
71 Twenty years after the Act’s passage, laypeople, and often their elected 
representatives, continue to undermine their legal position in denying appli-
cations to construct cell phone towers, by emphasizing that their objections are 
primarily based on fears of health risks. See, e.g., Deon J. Hampton, Ronkonkoma 
T-Mobile Cell Tower to Be Built Despite Concerns, NEWSDAY (Long Island, NY), 
Jan. 17, 2016, http://www.newsday.com/long-island/Suffolk/ronkonkoma-t-mo 
bile-cell-tower-to-be-built-despite-concerns-1.11333828 [https://perma.cc/YGL7 
-SDVM] (reporting that residents near site fear tower will affect health); WeHo 
Planning Commission Rejects Verizon Wireless Request to Install Cell An-
tenna, ICT MONITOR WORLDWIDE, Dec. 4, 2015, at 2015 WLNR 35955535 
(West Hollywood, CA). 
2017] HOW MUCH IS “SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE”? 41 
arguments about aesthetics and property values had they not 
seemed secondary to impermissible health arguments.72 
 In 2002, the Eleventh Circuit agreed that the Act does not 
define “substantial evidence,” and, therefore, Congress must have 
meant the phrase to have its usual “scintilla/reasonable minds” 
definition.73 The court went on to say that aesthetic concerns 
could be the basis for the denial of a tower permit, but there had 
to be substantial evidence, and in the case before the court, there 
was no substantial evidence.74 County residents undermined their 
position by presenting petitions that contained no reasons why 
petitioners signed, and no evidence of the visual impact of the 
tower.75 This case is another example of residents and local gov-
ernment not understanding how to mount a case under the Act.76 
 On the other hand, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit, deciding a case about an eighty-five-foot 
tower in Des Moines, Iowa, concluded that the denial of the ex-
ception and variance needed for the construction was based on 
substantial evidence, even though there was no expert testimony.77 
The substantial evidence consisted of residents’ testimony that ice 
could form on the tower and damage cars in the parking lot be-
low;78 the tower would be seen from the windows on one side of the 
building, diminishing residents’ enjoyment of their property;79 
and the proximity of the tower would lower their property values.80 
The court said that it was common sense that ice would form on 
cell towers in Des Moines in the winter, that owners’ complaints 
about not enjoying their property if their views were of the tower 
were not merely “nebulous aesthetic concerns,” and that the view 
would reduce property values.81 The First Circuit also concluded 
that because local zoning boards are made up of lay citizens, 
                                                                                                                        
72 Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 495–96 (2d Cir. 1999). 
73 Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup Cty., 296 F.3d 1210, 1218 (11th Cir. 2002). 
74 Id. at 1219–20. 
75 Id. at 1219. 
76 Id. at 1222. 
77 USCOC of Greater Iowa, Inc. v. Zoning Bd., 465 F.3d 817, 823 (8th Cir. 
2006). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
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they do not have to make extensive factual findings to support a 
decision to deny an application to construct a cell phone tower.82 
The foregoing opinions suggest that litigation outcomes are cur-
rently so fact and court sensitive that it is important to create ar-
ticulated standards that can be replicated and met in cases across 
the country.83 
 By 2011, local residents in some locations had become 
more sophisticated in presenting their cases against a tower 
siting.84 The United States District Court for the Middle District 
of Florida affirmed Manatee County’s denial of a permit to build 
a 150-foot tower within a residential golf course community.85 
The court cited the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion that aesthetic con-
cerns could be the basis for a permit denial.86 In addition to resi-
dents’ testimony at a hearing, they presented slide shows, maps, 
graphs, a photo simulation, and a video presentation.87 Residents 
also presented academic articles about a tower’s negative impact 
on property values, and a financial planner and two realtors 
testified about that.88 The court concluded that this record con-
stituted substantial evidence on which to base a permit denial.89 
2. Aesthetics 
 Often, over the years, a court’s affirmation of a local gov-
ernment’s denial of a permit to construct a cell tower depended 
on whether the government’s decision was based on substantial 
evidence of specific aesthetic problems that would be created by 
the tower.90 However, even with twenty years of experience, 
what that means is still unclear.91 In 2016, the United States 
                                                                                                                        
82 Second Generation Props., LP v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d 620, 629 (1st 
Cir. 2002). 
83 See id. at 635. 
84 See, e.g., Vertex Dev., LLC v. Manatee Cty., 761 F. Supp. 2d 1348 (M.D. 
Fla. 2011). 
85 Id. at 1371. 
86 Id. at 1362. 
87 Id. at 1361. 
88 Id. at 1366–67. 
89 Id. at 1370–71. 
90 Cellular S. Real Estate, Inc. v. City of Mobile, No. 15-00387-CG-B, 2016 
WL 3746661, at *7 (S.D. Ala. July 8, 2016). 
91 Id. 
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District Court for the Southern District of Alabama undertook a 
review of all district court cases within the Eleventh Circuit 
about towers and aesthetics and concluded that there is very 
little consistency and “no bright line rule to determine whether a 
given amount of aesthetic evidence is enough to support a find-
ing of substantial evidence.”92 Nevertheless, two Eleventh Circuit 
tower siting cases, decided in 2002 within two weeks of each 
other, suggest the kinds of facts that will predispose a court to 
decide in favor of either the telecom company or the local gov-
ernment denying the tower permit.93 
 In Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup County,94 the telecom 
company applied to construct a 250-foot tower.95 At a hearing on 
the application, the county zoning administrator submitted an 
affidavit stating that several local residents told him they op-
posed the tower presumably because it was visually obtrusive, but 
there were no specific objections.96 Five petitions opposing the 
tower were submitted, but some of them were missing information 
and none contained any specific objections.97 Immediately after the 
hearing, the county board voted to deny the construction appli-
cation.98 The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that aesthetic val-
ues were a legitimate local concern,99 but affirmed the district 
court’s order to the county to approve the tower application100 
because “citizens’ generalized concerns about aesthetics are in-
sufficient to constitute substantial evidence upon which the [b]oard 
could rely.”101 
 Just two weeks earlier in American Tower Ltd. Partnership 
v. City of Huntsville,102 the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district 
                                                                                                                        
92 Id. 
93 Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup Cty., 296 F.3d 1210, 1219–20 (11th Cir. 2002); 
Am. Tower LP v. City of Huntsville, 295 F.3d 1203, 1208–09 (11th Cir. 2002). 
94 Preferred Sites, 296 F.3d at 1212. 
95 Id. at 1213. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 1214. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 1222. 
101 Id. at 1219. 
102 Am. Tower LP v. City of Huntsville, 295 F.3d 1203, 1204 (11th Cir. 2002). 
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court and decided in favor of the local zoning board, holding that 
the board’s decision to deny the application to construct a cell 
tower was supported by substantial evidence.103 In this case, the 
board heard testimony from a local realtor who said that once 
people in the neighborhood knew about the proposed tower, it 
became harder to sell neighborhood houses, devaluing homes 
and harming the area.104 She testified that she lost potential 
buyers for her own property because of the tower.105 The board 
also heard testimony from other residents about the tower’s 
negative aesthetic impact and its unusual proximity to schools 
and soccer fields.106 The facts of these two cases are not dramat-
ically different, but the cases indicate the importance of evidence 
that particularizes the negative aesthetic impact of a cell tower 
in order to be considered substantial and, therefore, sufficient to 
support a denial of permission to construct a tower.107 
 In T-Mobile USA Inc. v. City of Anacortes,108 T-Mobile ap-
plied to the City of Anacortes for a special permit to erect a 116-foot 
monopole for cell phone service.109 Some residents claimed that 
because the monopole would not be fully screened, it would have 
a negative effect on the neighborhood and their views.110 The 
city denied the application on that basis.111 The Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the denial was based on “more than a scintilla of 
evidence” and, therefore, constituted substantial evidence suf-
ficient to support the denial under the Act.112 A significant factor 
was that the Anacortes Municipal Code provided that the prob-
lems mentioned by the residents were issues that could be con-
sidered in decisions about special use permits.113 
                                                                                                                        
103 Id. at 1209. 
104 Id. at 1208. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 1208–09. 
107 Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup Cty., 296 F.3d 1210, 1219 (11th Cir. 
2002); Am. Tower, 295 F.3d at 1208. 
108 T-Mobile USA Inc. v. City of Anacortes, 572 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2009). 
109 Id. at 988. 
110 Id. at 994–95. 
111 Id. at 989–90. 
112 Id. at 995. 
113 Id. at 994. 
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3. Relevance of Local Zoning Codes 
 One of the more important criteria that has developed for 
determining whether the substantial evidence standard has been 
met when a local government denies a tower siting permit, is the 
local government’s consideration of the requirements of local zoning 
ordinances.114 The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, 
and Ninth Circuits115 have acknowledged that the Act “itself 
does not provide the legal basis to deny an application to con-
struct a personal wireless facility. That authority must be found 
in state or local law.”116 The Fourth Circuit consistently held 
that the failure to comply with local zoning regulations is a sig-
nificant factor justifying the denial of an application for a cell 
phone tower,117 and under some circumstances may even be suf-
ficient by itself.118 
 The Eighth Circuit has said that the Act has not displaced lo-
cal zoning law when it comes to cell towers because the Act does not 
contain any substantive law about granting or denying permits for 
cell towers.119 Thus, substantial evidence of aesthetic harmony120 or 
the views in a public park,121 as well as goals contained in local 
                                                                                                                        
114 PI Telecom Infrastructure, LLC v. City of Jacksonville, 104 F. Supp. 3d 
1321, 1342 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (citing federal district court decisions from 2009 
and 2010); Vertex Dev., LLC v. Manatee Cty., 761 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1364 
(M.D. Fla. 2011) (noting the Act permits local government to apply standards 
in local zoning codes). 
115 Sprint Spectrum, LP v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of the Borough of 
Paramus N.J., 606 F. Appx. 669, 672 (3d Cir. 2015); T-Mobile Cent. LLC v. 
Charter Twp. of W. Bloomfield, 691 F.3d 794, 798–99 (6th Cir. 2012); T-Mobile 
N.E. LLC v. City Council of Newport News, 674 F.3d 380, 387 (4th Cir. 2012); 
MetroPCS, Inc. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 400 F.3d 715, 723–24 (9th 
Cir. 2005); Voicestream Minneapolis, Inc. v. St. Croix Cty., 342 F.3d 818, 830 
(7th Cir. 2003); S.W. Bell Mobile Sys. v. Todd, 244 F.3d 51, 57 (1st Cir. 2001); 
Sprint Spectrum LP v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 644 (2d Cir. 1999). 
116 Willoth, 176 F.3d at 644. 
117 USCOC of Va. RSA #3, Inc. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 343 
F.3d 262, 271 (4th Cir. 2003); 360 degrees Commc’ns Co. v. Bd. of Supervi-
sors, 211 F.3d 79, 84 (4th Cir. 2000). 
118 USCOC of Va. RSA #3, 343 F.3d at 271. 
119 USCOC of Greater Iowa, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 465 F.3d 
817, 822 (8th Cir. 2006). 
120 Vertex Dev., LLC v. Manatee Cty., 761 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1365 (M.D. 
Fla. 2011). 
121 PI Telecom Infrastructure, LLC v. City of Jacksonville, 104 F. Supp. 3d 
1321, 1344 (M.D. Fla. 2015). 
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zoning codes, can be grounds for denying a variance for a cell 
tower.122 In cases in which those two issues were grounds for the 
denial of variances to erect cell phone towers, the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Florida accepted as sub-
stantial evidence combinations of academic articles, photographs, 
and testimony by real estate professionals.123 
 The San Francisco Planning Code says that the city may 
take into consideration “community need” in deciding whether 
or not to approve applications for conditional uses which include 
cell phone facilities.124 When a telecom company applied for a 
permit to erect six antennas fifty-three feet above the sidewalk 
in the Richmond neighborhood, the City Zoning Board denied 
the application on the grounds that the Richmond neighborhood 
did not need additional telecom facilities.125 The Ninth Circuit 
concluded the Board’s denial was supported by substantial evi-
dence because even the applicant’s representatives testified that five 
other telecom providers had antennas in the same neighborhood 
providing excellent coverage.126 In addition, local residents pro-
vided testimony, petitions, and site maps, all indicating excellent 
wireless coverage.127 
 The Sixth Circuit also looked at the local zoning code in 
Saginaw, Michigan, to determine whether the Saginaw Zoning 
Board supported with substantial evidence its denial of a vari-
ance for a telecom company to construct a 150-foot cell tower.128 
The court dismissed all three reasons for the denial: the aesthet-
ics concern was based on merely a few mentions and no discus-
sion at meetings;129 the health concern was not permitted by the 
Act;130 and offering an alternative construction site was not based 
on any criteria in the Zoning Code for granting a variance.131 
The court concluded that a denial of a variance cannot be based 
                                                                                                                        
122 Id. at 1326. 
123 Id. at 1350; Vertex, 761 F. Supp. 2d at 1366. 
124 MetroPCS, Inc. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 400 F.3d 715, 725 (9th 
Cir. 2005). 
125 Id. at 718, 725. 
126 Id. at 726. 
127 Id. 
128 New Par v. City of Saginaw, 301 F.3d 390, 392, 396 (6th Cir. 2002). 
129 Id. at 398. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
2017] HOW MUCH IS “SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE”? 47 
on substantial evidence if the grounds for the denial are not re-
lated to criteria in the zoning code.132 
 About twenty years after the Act became law, cases about 
denials of variances for towers still exist but local governments 
and local residents have become more sophisticated in present-
ing evidence that courts may consider substantial, particularly 
by connecting their objections to local zoning codes.133 For exam-
ple, in 2015, the Quorum Court of Washington County, Arkan-
sas, denied an application for construction of a 300-foot cell 
phone tower on property zoned agricultural.134 Residents in sur-
rounding neighborhoods, using pictures and simulations, objected 
to the tower on the bases of safety issues in the event of torna-
does and other weather incidents and the impact on residents’ 
views and property values, relating their objections to a specific 
section in the Washington County Zoning Code.135 The Eighth 
Circuit agreed that the application denial was supported by sub-
stantial evidence.136 
 In 2016, the United States District Court for the District 
of Kansas held that the Bel Aire City Council’s denial of a per-
mit to construct a 170-foot cell tower was supported by substan-
tial evidence.137 The court noted that the Council’s reasons for 
the denial were “clearly proper considerations” based on the city 
code and several city zoning regulations.138 The court also noted 
that the proposed “galvanized tower” would be five times the 
height of the homes in the residential neighborhood in which it 
would be located,139 and that the Act does not require a city 
council “to cast aside its common sense.”140 
                                                                                                                        
132 See id. 
133 See infra text accompanying notes 134–40. 
134 Smith Commc’ns, LLC v. Washington Cty., 785 F.3d 1253, 1256, 1259 
(8th Cir. 2015). 
135 Id. at 1255–56, 1259. The Eighth Circuit noted in its opinion that a 
member of the Quorum Court stated he “would not buy property in the area 
with the 300-foot tower so close.” Id. at 1259. 
136 Id. at 1259–60. 
137 See Stout & Co. v. City of Bel Aire, No. 2:15-CV-09323-JTM, 2016 WL 
3759440, at *1 (D. Kan. July 14, 2016). 
138 See id. at *9. 
139 See id. 
140 Id. 
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4. Substantial Evidence in New Jersey 
 The New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division has 
noted that the “substantial evidence” requirement is similar in both 
the Act and New Jersey’s Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL).141 
The court had a case in 2016 involving an application to erect a 
cell tower designed as a 120-foot flagpole.142 The application re-
quired the granting of a variance, and under New Jersey law, the 
applicant must provide proof of positive criteria, that is, “special 
reasons” for the variance, and negative criteria, that is, “the var-
iance ‘can be granted without substantial detriment to the public 
good and that it will not substantially impair the intent and the 
purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance.”143 The court then 
applied the “Sica balancing test” which the New Jersey Supreme 
Court fashioned for a variance case it decided before the Act be-
came law and which had nothing to do with telecom facilities.144 
Although New Jersey law did not explicitly require a balancing 
test, the Sica court noted that  
 
[J]ust because an institution [or facility] is thought to be a 
good thing for the community is no reason to exempt it com-
pletely from restrictions designed to alleviate any baneful physi-
cal impact it may nonetheless exert in the interest of another 
aspect of the public good equally worthy of protection.145 
 
The Sica court then provided a general guide for balancing positive 
and negative criteria when deciding whether to grant a variance.146 
 First, the local agency should identify the public interest and 
decide how compelling the proposed use is in satisfying the public 
interest.147 Second, the local agency should identify the detrimental 
                                                                                                                        
141 See T-Mobile N.E., LLC v. Borough of Mendham Zoning Bd., No. L-2719-
10, 2015 WL 10091529, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 16, 2016). 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at *2 (citing Sica v. Bd. of Adjustment, 603 A.2d 30 (N.J. 1992). 
144 See id. at *2–3, *7–10. The Sica case concerned the denial of a variance 
application for the construction of a residential facility for rehabilitation of 
head trauma victims in a residential zone. Sica, 603 A.2d at 32–33. 
145 Sica, 603 A.2d at 35 (quoting the concurring opinion in Roman Catholic 
Diocese v. Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, 220 A.2d 97, 102–03 (N.J. 1966)). 
146 Id. at 37. 
147 Id. 
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effect of granting the variance, recognizing that a minimal det-
rimental effect may not outweigh a beneficial use.148 Third, the 
local agency may reduce the impact of the detrimental effect by 
requiring conditions be met before the variance is granted.149 
And fourth, the local agency should balance the positive and 
negative criteria and decide whether granting the variance would 
be substantially detrimental to the public good.150 
 The 2016 New Jersey appellate court stated that when do-
ing a Sica balancing test, the positive criteria are satisfied if an 
FCC-licensed carrier provides credible testimony that there is a 
gap in cell phone coverage.151 Then the court addressed the neg-
ative criteria: first, the local agency has to decide whether grant-
ing the variance would “cause such damage to the character of 
the neighborhood as to constitute ‘substantial detriment to the 
public good;’”152 and second, the local agency must have proof 
that the proposed use would not “‘substantially impair the in-
tent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance.’”153 
 After setting up these very specific criteria, the court ana-
lyzed the local zoning board’s denial of T-Mobile Northeast’s 
application to erect a 120-foot monopole in a shopping center.154 
The court noted the similarity between New Jersey’s municipal 
law and the federal Act in requiring zoning boards to base their 
decisions on “‘substantiated proofs rather than unsupported alle-
gations.’”155 The New Jersey appellate court concluded that T-
Mobile satisfied the positive criteria, and, because there were no 
findings on the impact of the monopole on adjacent properties or 
the impairment of the zone plan or ordinance, and T-Mobile also 
satisfied the negative criteria, the application for a variance 
should be granted.156 
                                                                                                                        
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 See T-Mobile N.E., LLC v. Borough of Mendham Zoning Bd., No. L-
2719-10, 2015 WL 10091529, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 16, 2016). 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at *4 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D–70(d)). 
154 Id. at *8–11. 
155 Id. at *8 (quoting Cell S. of N.J., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment of W. 
Windsor Twp., 796 A.2d 247, 255 (N.J. 2002)). 
156 Id. at *11. 
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 The New Jersey court’s detailed approach with specific 
steps for deciding whether to grant a variance for a telecom fa-
cility appears much more standardized than basing a decision on 
whether it was supported by substantial evidence.157 The ultimate 
conclusion, however, relies on the same assessment about the 
amount and quality of the evidence presented on each side of the 
controversy.158 The New Jersey court, while talking about posi-
tive and negative criteria, ultimately noted that a local agency 
cannot base a denial of a variance on only unsupported resident 
testimony when there is no qualified expert testimony.159 
5. Substantial Evidence in New York 
 Because New York law provides that telecom providers 
are public utilities for the purpose of zoning applications, appli-
cations to erect telecom facilities are reviewed under an easier 
“public necessity” standard.160 For telecom providers, that stan-
dard means that the applicant for a zoning permit must show 
that there are gaps in cell phone service, the proposed facility 
will eliminate the gaps, and the proposed facility will intrude only 
minimally on the community.161 Because of the advantage given 
to public utilities, the assumption is that no substantial evidence 
exists to support a denial of the permit if the telecom provider 
demonstrates those three factors.162 If the absence of just one of 
those factors is supported by substantial evidence, then a court 
will not overrule a permit denial by the local government.163 
 Negatively affecting the aesthetics of an area can be grounds 
for denying a zoning application in New York.164 Generalized or 
speculative negative effects will not constitute substantial evi-
dence supporting a denial; instead, there must be objective evidence 
                                                                                                                        
157 See id. at *2–4. 
158 See id. at *11. 
159 Id. 
160 T-Mobile N.E., LLC v. Town of Islip, 893 F. Supp. 2d 338, 355 
(E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 356 (citing Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 
495 (2d Cir. 1999); Suffolk Outdoor Advert. v. Hulse, 373 N.E.2d 263, 265 
(N.Y. 1977)). 
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in the form of photographs, site plans, surveys, or something 
similar to indicate that residents will be able to see the proposed 
facility and that “there will be an actual ‘negative visual impact 
on the community.’”165 It is also important that the local Zoning 
Code indicates the locality’s commitment to protecting residen-
tial districts when making decisions about the location of tele-
com facilities.166 The Second Circuit, in deciding a case about 
siting telecom towers in New York, noted the importance of the 
Act’s not requiring local governments to approve all telecom 
permit applications: denials are incentives for providers to cre-
ate new technology that improves reception and minimizes tow-
ers, satisfying the Act’s goal of encouraging innovation.167 
B. Significant Gap 
 Even if a local government’s denial of an application to 
erect a telecom facility is supported by substantial evidence, the 
denial will violate the Act if it prevents closure of significant 
gaps in cell phone service.168 Preventing closure of gaps is viola-
tive of the Act’s requirement that local governments “not prohibit 
or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wire-
less services.”169 The problem with this formulation is there is no 
general rule about what constitutes a significant gap or what is 
an effective prohibition.170 Each litigated dispute is accordingly 
resolved based on its specific facts and circumstances.171 
                                                                                                                        
165 T-Mobile N.E., 893 F. Supp. 2d at 358 (quoting Cellular Telephone Co. 
v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
166 See id. at 362. 
167 Sprint Spectrum, LP v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 640 (2d Cir. 1999). 
168 Green Mountain Realty Corp. v. Leonard, 750 F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir. 2014). 
169 Id. (quoting Nat’l Tower, LLC v. Plainville Zoning Bd., 297 F.3d 14, 19 
(1st Cir. 2002)) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II)). For a discussion of the 
Act’s effective prohibition rule, see, e.g., Andrew Erber, Note, The Effective 
Prohibition Preemption in Modern Wireless Tower Siting, 66 FED. COMM. L.J. 
357 (2014); Lucas R. White, Note, Untangling the Circuit Splits Regarding 
Cell Tower Siting Policy and 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7): When Is a Denial of One 
Effectively a Prohibition on All?, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1981 (2013). 
170 Green Mountain, 750 F.3d at 40. 
171 Id. (citing Second Generation Props., LP v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d 
620, 630 (1st Cir. 2002)). For a discussion of the early foundational cases on 
“significant gap,” see generally Stephanie E. Niehaus, Note, Bridging the 
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 The Third Circuit created a two-prong test for deciding 
whether an effective prohibition exists.172 The telecom provider 
must demonstrate that, first, remote users have a significant gap 
in cell phone service and are not served by another provider; and, 
second, the gap will be filled in the least intrusive manner.173 
Clearly, this test does not explain what specific facts will consti-
tute a significant gap. The Second Circuit attempted more speci-
ficity: if the cell phone service gaps are very limited, such as 
inside buildings in a low population rural area or limited to few 
houses, then the “lack of coverage likely will be de minimis” and 
not be a significant gap that is the equivalent of prohibiting ser-
vice.174 The Tenth Circuit, in evaluating facts presented to show 
a significant gap, determined that a lack of reliable in-building 
or in-vehicle service and a gap in service along major highways 
would constitute significant gaps whereas “isolated ‘dead spots’” 
in “‘a small residential cul-de-sac,’” or in-building service “‘in a 
sparsely populated rural area,’” would not.175 Other courts decid-
ing whether there was a significant gap have wanted to know 
whether cell phone service was “sufficiently poor” and whether 
the number of affected users was sufficiently large.176 One city 
has argued that denial of a permit for facilities to improve in-
building cell phone service in an area that already has service is 
not equivalent to prohibiting wireless service, but the court was 
not persuaded because the area of weak or no service extended 
over several blocks.177 The First Circuit had, perhaps, the longest 
                                                                                                                        
(Significant) Gap: To What Extent Does the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
Contemplate Seamless Service?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 641 (2002). 
172 APT Pittsburgh Ltd. P’ship v. Penn Twp., 196 F.3d 469, 480 (3d Cir. 
1999); see also Nextel W. Corp. v. Unity Twp., 282 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 
2002) (then–Circuit Judge Alito confirming two-prong test). 
173 APT Pittsburgh, 196 F.3d at 480. 
174 Sprint Spectrum, LP v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 643–44 (2d Cir. 1999). 
175 AT&T Mobility Serv., LLC v. Vill. of Corrales, No. 15-2069, 2016 WL 
873398, at *3 (10th Cir. Mar. 8, 2016) (quoting Willoth, 176 F.3d at 643; Cel-
lular Tel. Co. v. Zoning Bd., 197 F.3d 64, 70 n.2 (3d Cir.1999)). 
176 Liberty Towers, LLC v. Zoning Hearing Bd., No. 10-1666, 2011 WL 
3496044, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2011) (quoting New Cingular Wireless PCS, 
LLC v. Zoning Hearing Bd., No. 06-2932, 2009 WL 3127756, at *7 (E.D. Pa. 
Sept. 29, 2009)); New Cingular Wireless PCS, 2009 WL 3127756, at *7 (quot-
ing Am. Cellular Network Co. v. Upper Dublin Twp., 203 F. Supp. 2d 383, 
389 (E.D. Pa. 2002)). 
177 PI Telecom Infrastructure, LLC v. City of Jacksonville, 104 F. Supp. 3d 
1321, 1347–48 (M.D. Fla. 2015). 
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list of factors to consider in deciding whether a gap was signifi-
cant: the physical size of the gap, the kind of area in which the 
gap was located, the number of users affected, whether all the 
provider’s users in the gap area were affected, and the percent of 
calls that were not connected or were dropped.178 Nevertheless, 
it is left to local governments and courts to determine the size of 
the gap, the number of users affected, or the percent of unsuc-
cessful calls that constitutes a significant gap.179 
 The question of whose perspective should a significant 
gap be considered is a more specific issue. Telecom providers have 
argued that the proper inquiry is whether a particular provider 
has significant gaps in its cell phone service, whereas local gov-
ernments have argued that no significant gap exists if residents 
have adequate access through other providers.180 Through the first 
ten years after the Act’s passage, different courts took different 
positions on this issue.181 In 2009, the FCC answered the question 
by issuing a declaratory ruling that the Act’s prohibits-or-has-the-
effect-of-prohibiting-the-provision-of-personal-wireless-services reg-
ulation is violated when a local government denies an application 
to construct telecom facilities on the grounds that other providers 
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are already providing service in the same area.182 Since then, some 
courts have concluded that because a goal of the Act is to pro-
mote competition, a gap must be evaluated from the provider’s 
position.183 The United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York, citing the First Circuit, concluded that an 
any-service-equals-no-effective-prohibition rule would not make 
sense because it would not help the user of AT&T Wireless, for 
example, who does not have service if a gap is filled by Verizon 
or Sprint.184 The Sixth Circuit, in a case of first impression, con-
sidered the FCC ruling and the varied approaches of five other 
circuit courts and adopted the standards of the FCC and the 
First and Ninth Circuits, namely that the significant gap refers 
to a gap in the individual telecom applicant’s service.185 The 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan 
declared the FCC ruling to be determinative on the issue of a sig-
nificant gap’s being assessed based on an individual provider’s 
coverage without consideration of whether other carriers provide 
service in the gap.186 
 Nevertheless, three years after the FCC ruling, the 
Fourth Circuit was still interpreting the Act’s “effective prohibi-
tion” language as meaning one of only three actions: “a ‘blanket 
ban’ on wireless service,” “a general policy that essentially guar-
antees rejection of all wireless facility applications,” or “the de-
nial of an application for one particular site is ‘tantamount’ to a 
general prohibition of service.”187 This definition of the Act’s 
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prohibition is clearly looking at the prohibition from the position 
of the user rather than the provider.188 
 In 1999, the Third Circuit adopted a user rule, consider-
ing a gap significant only if an area is not served by any cell 
phone provider.189 The court confirmed its adoption of the user 
rule in 2002.190 After the 2009 FCC ruling, district courts in the 
Third Circuit were left with a predicament as to whether they 
should be following the Third Circuit’s user rule or the FCC pro-
vider rule. The United States District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania has noted an issue of whether deference 
should be given to the FCC ruling, but found it unnecessary to 
discuss the issue because of the facts of its case.191 On the other 
hand, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania acknowledged the split between the Third Circuit 
and the FCC and decided that “under well-established principles 
of administrative law, the FCC’s Declaratory Ruling is entitled to 
deference from the federal courts.”192 Similarly, the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey acknowledged the 
Third Circuit’s user rule, recognized that other circuits rejected 
the user rule, and concluded that it had to follow the FCC’s pro-
vider rule interpretation of the Act.193 
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 Unfortunately, with more than twenty years of experience 
under the Act, some courts are still concluding that “‘[s]ignificant 
gap determinations are extremely fact-specific inquiries that defy 
any bright-line legal rule.’”194 Given that problem, courts are 
sometimes aided by scientific tools that can clarify factual ques-
tions. Two tools that the telecom industry uses to demonstrate the 
inadequacy of existing signals are radio frequency propagation 
maps and drive tests.195 Propagation maps are computer models 
that predict signal strength within a geographic area covered by 
the proposed cell tower.196 Drive tests are empirical studies con-
ducted by driving a vehicle outfitted with sensitive radio fre-
quency scanning and global positioning equipment that records 
actual signal strength in an area.197 These tools, which are widely 
used by the industry, help telecom companies make the case 
there is a significant gap in cell phone service. Recently, even a 
local zoning hearing board in Pennsylvania used a propagation 
study to support its denial of a tower siting permit when there 
were alternate sites more to the residents’ liking.198 Furthermore, 
the board successfully argued that the telecom company’s propaga-
tion study was inconsistent with its drive test results and, there-
fore, it was unreliable, thus creating the substantial evidence 
the board needed to support its permit denial.199 
C. Recent Cases 
 With over twenty years of litigation deciding “substantial 
evidence” and “significant gap” questions, one might think that 
courts or Congress or the FCC would have supplied the answers 
so local governments could avoid lawsuits when they deny a 
permit for a cell phone tower, but that is obviously not the case.200 
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In the twentieth year and going forward after the Act’s passage, 
the litigation continues.201 In many of the cases, the outcome 
seems predictable and litigation avoidable. 
 The majority of recent cases have been decided in favor of 
the telecom companies.202 For example, in Orange County—
County of Poughkeepsie Ltd. Partnership v. Town of East Fish-
kill,203 the Second Circuit held that the town’s denial of Verizon’s 
application to construct a 150-foot monopole204 was an effective 
prohibition of wireless services in violation of the Act.205 Verizon 
claimed it needed the monopole to close a significant gap in cell 
phone service.206 The court said deciding whether a gap is signif-
icant “is a ‘fact-bound’ question that requires a case-by-case de-
termination.”207 The court concluded that evidence showed that 
the gap affected about 35,000 people every day—a significant 
gap.208 Verizon investigated alternate sites and concluded that 
none would remedy the existing gap.209 It took four years from 
the time Verizon submitted its application for the permit210 until 
the Second Circuit rendered its verdict.211 It would seem that if 
Verizon had spent time and resources in good faith, before even 
applying for a permit, to explain the legal and technical facts to 
the town and its residents, litigation might have been avoided, 
serving the interests of all parties. 
 In Vantage Tower Group, LLC v. Chatham County—
Savannah Metropolitan Planning Commission,212 Vantage sub-
mitted an application for a variance to build a 127-foot cell tower 
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where the City of Savannah prohibits towers taller than eighty-
five feet.213 The city council denied the request for the variance 
in a letter that did not give any reasons for the decision.214 The 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia 
held that the city violated the Act by not providing any reasons 
for its decision.215 The Act does not provide a remedy when its 
provisions have been violated, but in most similar cases, courts 
have ordered the government to approve the permit.216 This court 
decided that the city acted in good faith and so remanded Van-
tage’s request back to the city “hop[ing]” that this time the city 
would give “a list of detailed reasons” for its decision.217 This situa-
tion is a great waste of resources for the telecom company, the 
city, the court, and ultimately ratepayers and taxpayers. Delay is a 
strategy but, in the case of cell towers, it does not serve the pub-
lic interest. The city should have done it correctly the first time. 
 NE Colorado Cellular, Inc. v. City of North Platte218 is an-
other case that makes one wonder about the legal advice the city 
was getting or if its officials were just acting to win favor among 
their residents who are their voters. Viaero Wireless applied for 
a permit to erect a 100-foot cell tower.219 The city denied the 
permit on the grounds that the tower would not be in compliance 
with the city code because it “was not ‘in harmony with the 
character of the area.’”220 The court concluded that the denial 
was not based on substantial evidence and ordered the city to 
grant the permit “without undue delay or obstacle ... not later 
than ten days.”221 Generally, the “not in harmony” reasoning is 
successful when the proposed tower is in a residential area and 
is viewable from many homes or blocks residents’ view of a sce-
nic landscape.222 In this case the proposed site was the parking 
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lot for a bar and tobacco shop.223 The surrounding property was 
zoned light industrial or highway commercial and included an 
auto repair shop, a lot storing Army Reserve vehicles, and ware-
houses.224 Although there were a few residences in the area, one 
complaining resident admitted that her house was an “oasis” in 
a commercial area.225 
 The United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Alabama in July 2016 heard a case with similar facts and 
arrived at the same result: no substantial evidence to support 
the city’s reasons for denying a permit for a cell tower in an area 
zoned for community business districts.226 The city cited safety con-
cerns including dangers from hazardous materials and storms, 
but provided no evidence that the concerns were realistic.227 
Residents also had aesthetic concerns, but protests about the 
impact on views were not supported with photographs or any 
other substantial evidence; their complaints were “generalized,” 
not specifically about the tower and area at issue.228 
 Telecom companies have lost only a few tower-siting cases 
in the last two years, one seemingly caused by the company’s 
sloppy work, another because the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax 
County, Virginia did its job well. In the former, Nextel Commu-
nications of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Board.,229 
Nextel did not comply with the local zoning ordinance because it 
did not make a good faith effort for its proposed tower to provide 
cell phone service by the least intrusive means.230 Nextel did not 
contact the FCC or other companies to get any information about 
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co-location, which would have been preferable to the community.231 
In order to show that its proposed tower would eliminate a sig-
nificant gap, Nextel provided a propagation study and a drive test 
report, but the results of the two were inconsistent so the zoning 
board found the information unreliable, substantial evidence on 
which to base its denial of a permit.232 
 In Cellco Partnership v. Board of Supervisors,233 Verizon 
applied to the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors to construct 
a 140-foot cell tower to remedy a service gap.234 The board’s main 
objection was to the adverse visual impact on the local residen-
tial community and historical sites.235 The county’s comprehensive 
plan requires new facilities to be designed so their visual presence 
is “consistent with the character of the surrounding area.”236 The 
board concluded that Verizon’s proposed tower would not be har-
monious with its neighborhood and offered substantial evidence 
for its conclusion: pictures and photo simulations based on a bal-
loon fly test demonstrating that the tower would be visible from 
twenty-two local residences; pictures demonstrating that the 
tower would be at least four times the height of local homes and at 
least twice the height of nearby trees; testimony that proposed 
plantings would take ten years to grow to less than a quarter of 
the tower’s height; testimony from a local realtor that the tower 
would lower home prices; and specific evidence from numerous 
residents.237 The court acknowledged the testimony of Verizon’s 
experts about the need for the tower, but noted that “the views 
of the community ‘will often trump those of … experts in the minds 
of reasonable legislators.’”238 The court concluded that the board 
had a large amount of evidence indicating that the proposed tower 
was inconsistent with the county’s comprehensive plan, and those 
inconsistencies provided substantial evidence supporting the 
board’s decision to deny Verizon’s application.239 Supporting the 
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board’s position was the fact that it had approved 550 applica-
tions for wireless facilities, eighty-seven of them for Verizon, so 
there was no reason for the court to find that the board was op-
posed to every facility.240 
SOLUTIONS 
 Early on, the Second Circuit said it did not “read the [Act] 
to allow the goals of increased competition and rapid deployment 
of new technology to trump all other important considerations, 
including the preservation of the autonomy of states and munic-
ipalities.”241 The Act’s basic notion was to allow local zoning au-
thorities to maintain their control over their territories with a few 
new limitations that would encourage cell phone service companies 
to provide access to everyone.242 In hindsight, this arrangement 
still seems like a good idea. Some commentators have approved 
the Act as a cooperative model balancing the interests of local 
governments with federal objectives.243 The problems are the 
strong competing interests involved and the lack of specific defi-
nitions for the limitations.244 It would have been difficult to an-
ticipate the specific differences of opinion that have arisen, but 
once they did, members of Congress should have amended the 
statute to deal with the problems that exist and the changes in 
technology over the last twenty years. With twenty years of ex-
perience, the Act should no longer be a “make-work-for-attorneys” 
act. However, with so much litigation from which to learn, all 
interested parties should be able to better avoid it. 
 Residents of the Town of Ramapo in New York should 
have been incensed that twelve years after the Act’s passage, its 
planning board gave health risks as a significant reason for de-
nying T-Mobile’s application to construct a cell phone tower 
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within the town, even though the board knew that health concerns 
are an illegitimate ground for a denial.245 The cases indicate that 
local governments must read the statute and understand its 
limitations;246 must have local zoning laws listing all the factors 
that will be considered in deciding whether to approve an appli-
cation to erect a cell tower and those factors may not be an abso-
lute or a de facto ban on cell towers;247 must cite the local zoning 
laws when denying an application to erect a cell tower;248 and 
must support denials with specific evidence, not generalized 
complaints, that may include testimony by local real estate 
salespersons or appraisers;249 testimony by local residents that 
names specific negative effects of the specific tower at issue;250 
academic articles;251 and testimony by experts about radio fre-
quency tests or drive-by tests or balloon demonstrations.252 
 For their part, residents who oppose a cell tower must also 
do their homework to understand the statute and the kinds of 
evidence that will support their claims. In particular, they have 
to understand to avoid making claims about health concerns and 
generalized claims about cell towers. Their opposition must be 
based on specific complaints about their situation vis-a-vis the 
proposed tower. Their complaints must be supported by evidence 
that may include photographs of the existing residential area, 
photographs of balloon tests, local realtor testimony about lost 
sales and lower prices because of the threat of the proposed tow-
er, and maps of local commercial areas better suited to accom-
modating a cell tower.253 
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 Although telecom companies are well prepared with strate-
gies and teams of legal and technical experts, they would save 
time and money if they did not need to litigate after a permit 
denial. It would be in their interest to help educate town boards 
and residents about the Act and to hold meetings about poten-
tial sites before submitting permit applications. Commentators 
in the field of conflict resolution have developed “The Mutual 
Gains Framework” for “dealing with an angry public.”254 The 
framework has six principles: 
 
1. acknowledge the concerns of the other side; 
2. encourage joint fact[-]finding; 
3. offer contingent commitments to minimize impacts if they 
do occur; promise to compensate unintended effects; 
4. accept responsibility, admit mistakes, and share power; 
5. act in a trustworthy fashion at all times; and 
6. focus on building long-term relationships.255 
 
The framework seems particularly well-suited to the con-
flict between telecom companies and local residents when the 
issue is a cell tower. Residents want seamless cell phone service, 
and federal law will not allow them to keep cell phone facilities out 
of their towns. So they have an interest in working with a telecom 
company so long as they believe they are being consulted, their 
input is taken seriously, and a few will not have to bear the burden 
alone so everyone may have adequate cell phone service. The crea-
tors of the framework have said they have seen positive results 
in many cases in which the principles were used along with other 
conflict resolution tools and techniques, but they admit that they 
have not seen substantial changes in government or corporate 
behavior.256 If telecom companies gave this method a chance, they 
might find they could save considerable time and money.257 
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